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Introduction
Syrian foreign policy has focused to a great extent 
on its eastern neighbor Lebanon since the rise to power of 
Hafez Assad in 1970. Moreover, since the civil war in 
Lebanon between 1975 and 1976 Syria has become more deeply 
and directly involved there. Therefore, events in Lebanon 
have become more central to Syria*s foreign policy? and 
Assad's actions, in turn, have had a much greater impact on 
events there. Realistically, however, the place of Lebanon 
in Assad's foreign policy cannot be viewed as if in a 
vacuum. Syria's policies in Lebanon have not been directed 
solely by events there, nor has the impact of Syrian actions 
been felt solely in Lebanon.
To find the impetus for Syrian policies as well as 
the consequences thereof, one must view events in a wider 
regional and international context. To a great extent the 
causes and consequences of Syria's policies can be found at 
home in Syria, in the affairs of the region, and even in 
global relations. Beyond Lebanon and Syria the parameters 
of this equation must also include Israel, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, the U,S., and the U.S.S.R., among 
others. But even under the general headings of "Lebanon" 
and "Syria" are a multitude of subnational divisions and 
factors which fit into the equation. The communal nature of
1
2Lebanon and the domestic conditions in Syria make the con­
sideration of either as a monolith impossible. Thus the 
statement that Syrian policy in Lebanon is guided by political- 
strategic consideration in Damascus, although true, is suf­
ficiently vague to render it almost meaningless without 
considerable qualification. Nevertheless, an examination of 
this policy must begin at this general level.
Lebanon*s proximity to Syria has always been a major 
factor behind Syrian involvement there. The two states share 
a large border, and their populations have maintained a high 
degree of economic interaction and common social identifica­
tion. Therefore, events in one place are bound to have reper­
cussions in the other. Violence and instability in Lebanon 
is potentially destabilizing to Syria, and Assad's regime is 
particularly sensitive to this. Similarly, an unstable, 
chaotic Lebanon invites direct and indirect foreign involve­
ment close to Syria's border and jeopardizes its position of 
dominance there. Strategically, this weakens Syria's 
security; politically, its effectiveness in its larger for­
eign policy is diminished vis-A-vis Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. Lastly, competition globally for influence has 
brought the superpowers into this region to fill roles vary­
ing from combattant to mediator. In essence then, the 
instability and intricacy of politics, and the inability to 
reach a national consensus created a power vacuum in Lebanon, 
which Assad has sought to end through the establishment of
3Syrian hegemony and the stabilization of Lebanon, for stra­
tegic and political reasons. At the same time the vacuum 
has invited the involvement of numerous other actors in 
spite of Syria’s attempts to prevent it, making Syria’s 
objectives more difficult to reach.
Chapter One: Syrian Involvement in Lebanon 1975-1976
The motivation for Syrian actions and policies in 
Lebanon become clearer with an understanding of events in 
Lebanon beginning in the mid-1970s, and their background. In 
April 1975 intercommunal violence erupted in Lebanon which 
quickly spiraled into all-out civil war involving a multi­
plicity of actors, including Syria. At the root of the 
strife were inherent faults in the political-economic infra­
structure of Lebanon itself, exacerbated by certain develop­
ments beginning in the late 1960s. These developments 
reflected concurrent fundamental changes in Lebanese society, 
and, in turn, changed the nature of this civil war from 
crises in the past. Concomitantlv, the new scope of this 
civil war necessitated (in the view of Damascus) deeper 
Syrian involvement in support of its own policies in uebanon. 
These differences resulted in a significant new outcome of 
the war. "Unlike the Lebanese Civil War of i9r>8, that of 
1975-1976 resulted in a far-reaching transformation of the 
Lebanese political system. It established Syrian hegemony 
over Lebanon; led to the virt tl disappearance of the 
Lebanese state (at least temporarily)? destroyed the mechan­
isms, arrangements and conventions which had previously regu­
lated inter-communal relations; and damaged, possibly perma­
nently, the country's economic and administrative
4
5infrastructure. Clearly, it is necessary to examine the 
background of events and the factions involved in order to 
understand the events and results of the war.
The Lebanese political-economic system itself has 
been at the core of problems there. The fundamental notions 
guiding the system as it was conceived were an '’attachment 
. . . to political and economic libera ism, and its explicit 
recognition of the lingering sway held py confessional loyal­
ties."2 From this system emerged a fragile political balance 
in which most supported the status quo and did not allow for 
fundamental reform or significant modification; keeping 
Lebanon relatively stable for many years. Such intransi­
gence might have continued indefinitely if not for several 
pressures building against the balance, such as modernization 
and social mobilization among certain "have nots" within the 
structure. Moreover, these pressures were intensified by 
developments in the late 1960s in the region.
The National Covenant of 1943 gave do jure recogni­
tion te the prevailing Christian numerical and economic pre­
ponderance in Lebanon. Under the Covenant representation in 
the National Assembly, public administrative bodies, and the 
army was apportioned through a confessional, system among 
seventeen commun.i ties including Maronite Christians, Druse, 
Shiite Muslims, Greek Orthodox, Sunni Muslims, and others. 
Spec Ldl consideration was eiven, however, to certain dominant 
factions. For example, the president was to be a Maronite,
6the premier a Sunni, the speaker of the National Assembly a
Shiite, and the commander of the army a Maronite. Such a
structure prevented a strong consensus from building in the
central government, which might bring about drastic changes,
using the armed forces to extend government control over any
of the various factions and their militias. Any attempt to
4do so almost certainly would have led to civil war. The 
weakness of this system helped to preserve the economic 
liberalism and th«* * 11 favored by conservative elements
in Lebanon, especial! * « ** althier Maronite Christians.
In actual pr«n*t the system was weighted in favor 
of Christians out of proportion to their numbers. For 
example, the officer class of the armed forces was seventy- 
five percent Christian, causing resentment among Muslims who 
wanted greater control over military decisions. Christians, 
on the other hand, thought this command structure, without 
conscription, would be a guarantee against '’social radical­
ism or Moslem tendencies to align Lebanon closer with the
5Arab countries, especially Syria.” Thus, the system 
remained with a favorable lean toward the Christians— this, 
however, in the face of a continued population shift away 
from the wealthier Christians toward the more impoverished 
Muslims, especially Shiites. Apportionment continued to be 
based on an outdated census showing a Christian majority.
The Lebanese political infrastructure remained with 
a wealthy elite profiting from an uncontrolled economy and
7with a growing poor class, until developments beginning in 
the late 1960s changed it. After the Six Day War in 1967 
with Israel, agreements reached in Cairo among the Arab 
states (1969) established guidelines within which the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was to utilize 
Lebanon as a base of operations against Israel. This, how­
ever, provided a catalyst for growing dissatisfaction in 
Lebanon over the status quo. Israeli retaliation in Lebanon 
created problems for many Lebanese, especially those in the 
South.^ Repeated military incursions caused many in the 
South, especially Shiites, to flee to Beirut, crowding the 
political center with great masses of dissatisfied and 
alienated, impoverished communities. And after 1970 a heavy 
influx of Palestinean guerillas from Jordan provided a large 
number of political supporters and military aid for the here­
tofore quiescent Muslim groups in Lebanon, strengthening the 
Left and the newly politicized Shiites against the establish­
ment. Conseqn. 'tiy, the number and force of opposition to 
the government by the underprivileged increased. Nonethe­
less, the government maintained inadequate social and economic 
policies to bridge the gap between rich and poor--especially 
in the face of growing inflation and other economic troubles 
after 1973.8
Christians, on the other hand, came to resent the 
Palestinean presence for several reasons. First, the con­
servative leaders recognized the strength the Palestineans
8gave the Lebanese Left against the government. Second, they
resented being subjected to Israeli retaliation and feared
one day Israel might carve off a niece of southern Lebanon
as a buffer against Palestinean raids.^ Finally, the
Christians objected to the autonomous buildup of Palestinean
forces in Lebanon, creating a "state within a state."** As
a measure of protection various Christian factions began to
build up their own militias. With the growth and radicaliza-
t.ion of communities alienated from the political and economic
system, and increasing militarization on all sides, the stage
was thus set by 1975 for the civil war in Lebanon. On the
Left, factions were demanding a state which recognized their
new position with political-economic reforms; and on the
Right, the establishment was preparing to defend the exist- 
12ing system.
On the eve of civil war the country was divided into
two broad camps: those supporting and those opposing the
13status quo. On the side of the former, parties with a 
Christian-Maronite bias and their militias formed the core. 
Foremost among them was the Phalangist Party led by Pierre 
Gemayel along with his sons Bashir and Amin. The Phalangists 
started as a militant youth movement which fought for Leba­
nese independence but evolved into a political party by 
141952, with a corresponding military branch. The Pha­
langist Party tended toward moderacy on social and political 
iusues and reforms but was opposed to changes which
9
9endangered Christian supremacy; nor was it willing to sur­
render its military arm, the capabilities of which it had 
been enhancing since 1973, when Syrian-backed Palestinean 
forces prevented the Lebanese army from overcoming the
Palestineans in an attempt to extend government control over 
15the latter. The support of the Phalangists came mainly 
from middle and lower class Maronites.^
In addition to the Phalangists other groups also 
fell into this camp. A second party defending the status quo 
was the National Liberal Party led by Camille Chamoun, an 
archenemy of Druse leader Kamal Jumblat. Along with his sons
Dori and Danny, Chamoun led a party which represented the
, 17more conservative Christian establishment. A third force
in this coalition was headed by President Suleiman Franjieh
{elected 1970-1976) and his northern Lebanese militia. A
staunch defender of Christian dominance, Franjeh was at
first successful at stabilizing the government and restrain-
18ing the PLO but later lost control, leading to civil war. 
Together with the Phalangists these groups, which later
formed the Lebanese Front (September 1976), opposed Syrian
. . 19involvement m  Lebanon.
At the official level, the Lebanese army also main­
tained a pro-status quo character during this time but gen­
erally stayed out of the civil war to be used later. How­
ever, it disintegrated in the civil war, with Muslim elements
20forming the Lebanese Arab Army.
10
On the other side of the field, the anti-status quo 
camp included Leftist, Muslim, and Palestinean organizations. 
Very prominent among the Leftists was Druse leader Kamal 
Jumblat and his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which drew 
a great deal of support from the area of the Shouf. Also on 
the Left were organizations such as the Communist Party and
21the Ba'th Party with its pro-Iraqi and Pro-Syrian factions. 
Other groups within the anti-status quo camp included 
Nasserites, Sunni leaders, militant Shiites, and Palestinean 
organizations. In this last category was the PLO establish­
ment, which remained officially outside the fighting in the 
civil war until January 1976? the Rejectionists, who saw the 
war as a plot against them by the Christian establishment in 
Lebanon, and thus fought with the Leftists; and Al-Saiqa, the
Syrian-dominated Palestinean organization, which fought as a
22Syrian proxy. Essentially these groups demanded an end to
the system which gave Christians predominance in Lebanon.
Many, such as the PSP, rejected proposed Syrian reforms in
February 1976 as being too moderate. Moreover, the coalition
split after Syrian intervention between those who opposed and
those who supported Syrian involvement, with the latter
23coalescing into a third camp.
The civil war which began in 1975 can be broken down 
roughly into four main phases: spring and early summer 1975,
summer 1975 to the beginning of 1976, January to March 1976, 
and March to October 1976. The first phase began on April 13,
11
1975 when twenty-seven Palestineans on a bus were machine- 
gunned in a Phalangist-controlled suburb of Beirut. Pha- 
langist leaders, who had been calling on the Lebanese govern­
ment to repudiate the Cairo agreement of 1969 since February
24of that year, were accused of provoking a fight to get the
25army involved? and street warfare ensued. Throughout this
first phase the struggle was between the Phalangists and
2 6radical Palestinean elements, while Yasir Arafat, leader 
of the PLO establishment, attempted to extricate the majority 
of the mainstream Palestinean groups from the fighting, 
especially his al-Fatah and the al-Saiqa wing. Instead,
27Palestinean groups were aided with advisors and weapons.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese government took measures to end the
strife, including the formation of a military cabinet, but
to no avail; and the Syrian government, for its part, sought
to mediate a truce between warring factions, also without 
28success.
By that summer the civil war had entered a new phase
of broader conflict between the Christian militias and their
29Muslim, Leftist, and Palestinean adversaries. While Syria
vowed to continue to bring about a truce# the Lebanese gov-
30eminent was paralyzed? and the anti-status quo-forces were 
calling for Phalangist acceptance of their proposed reforms 
as a basis for talks to end the fighting. At the same 
time the fighting continued with no clear victor? and some 
Christian leaders, resigned to the improbability of returning
12
to the status quo ante-ellum, uegan to favor partition of
Lebanon and formation of a state giving Christians a clear 
32majority.
Tn January the Christians were on the verge of setting 
ip a separate state based on Mount Lebanon, the northern lit­
toral, and access to the port; of Beirut, prompting Syria to
3 3intervene in the fighting. In this third phase ’Syria 
tipped he bu La nee against the Christians and became the 
dominant fact or in L e b a n o n . S y r i a  then tried to use its 
position to impose moderate reforms granting Muslims a greater 
share in the ruling of Lebanon. Reelizing this was the best 
they could hone for, the Christians accepted the Syrian plan; 
but it wa s rejected by their opponents —  Syr ia * s traditional
i rallies. Some Muslims and Leftists said the reforms did not 
go far enough, while the PLO distrusted Syrian hegemony in 
Lebanon.
The result was a resumption of fighting in spring 1976 
with the Christians at a disadvantage. In this fourth stage 
Syria decided to uphold its plan with direct intervention of 
its regular forces in May and June on the side of the Chris­
tians. For a variety of reasons, however, the offensive 
failed. Meanwhile, fighting spread to South Lebanon where 
Israeli-supported Christian militias with links to the 
Lebanese Front battled Muslim soldiers who had broken off 
from the Lebanese army (known as the Lebanese Arab Army). 
Fighting then spread in August when Palestinean units
withdrew to the South after the i ' r il or Tall al-Za *tar. f
During the} stalemate that resulted for the rust of the summer,
Syria continued to put pressure on the rival camp to accept
its plan. Unable to obtain their consent, however, Syria
finally launched another offonsive--this time successful--
but stopped short of complete victory, using, instead, its
3 8new position at the Riyadh conference in October. The
Riyadh and Cairo conferences succeeded in ending the bulk of
39the fighting.
What was behind this peculiar turn of events in which 
Damascus, against domestic and regional pressures, turned on 
its traditional allies in Lebanon? Clearly, Syria*s imme­
diate rind long-term policies and interests must have been at 
stake in Lebanon. The prospect of a failure of Syrian poli­
cies and the consequential weakening of Syria’s position 
loomed after proposed Syrian reforms were rejected by its 
traditional supporters, and fighting continued. At this 
point., then, it would be worthwhile to examine exactly what 
Syrian mterests and policies were, and how they fit into the 
Lobane. e puzzle.
The reasons for Syrian interests in Lebanon at their
most general level are multifarious. Historically, Syrian
interests lie in the notion that Lebanon is actually part of
40a ’’Greater Syria.” Specifically, this tract of land 
included parts of present day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Israel under the Ottoman Empire.^
1 3
While the idea of
14
reincorporating these lands into one state originated with
Transjordan's ruler Abdullah, it was later incorporated into
Syrian nationalist ideology.^ Moreover, there has been
evidence of a revival of Syrian interest in reincorporating
Lebanon in recent years. This, it is expected, will occur
through a "long-term evolutionary process rather than a
4 3sudden revolutionary one, but the goal is there." Although
this objective is not expected to be realized in the near
future, the notion has nonetheless, prevented normal rela-
44tions between Syria and Lebanon.
At a political-strategic level the most motivating 
reason for Syrian interest in Lebanon is its proximity to 
Syria. There is a large border between the two, which main­
tain a high level of economic and social interaction? so 
developments in Lebanon have significant implications for 
the internal security of Assad's regime and the external 
security of the Syrian state. Chaos in Lebanon could spill 
over into Syria, upsetting the authority of the already 
troubled Assad regime; and the emergence from the anarchy in 
Lebanon of a state potentially hostile to Syria would 
threaten its security. For example, civil war and partition 
of Lebanon could lead to a Christian state hostile to Syria 
with a leaning toward Israel. Likewise, a pro-Iraqi state 
could emerge from the strife in Lebanon. Therefore, in lieu 
of annexation, which could not realistically be accomplished 
in the foreseeable future, Damascus instead has sought more
15
modest objectives which take into account the situation in 
Lebanon and Syria's political-strategic position vis-a-vis 
its neighbors.
These goals include the maintenance of relative sta- 
45bility in Lebanon to prevent others~~especially Israel-- 
from exploiting the instability to exert their own influence. 
Attempts to stabilize the Lebanese situation had been pur­
sued by supporting Syria's traditional allies in Lebanon 
while preventing a deterioration of the situation through 
mediation efforts. At the same time Syria refrained from 
direct intervention in order not to provoke Israeli or 
American responses which might bring them into conflict with
, _ 41> ,Syrian forces. Syria also sought to g a m  hegemony in
Lebanon and thereby impose its own solution to their prob- 
47lems. While such actions would presumably expedite sta­
bilization of Lebanon, these policies have also had regional, 
ramifications. Damascus has hoped the establishment of a 
"Pax Syriana" would demonstrate its credibility to the other 
actors in the region and help gain a position of influence 
for Syria in the Middle Mast:. Furthermore, the political 
and strategic advantages gained in asserting hegemony in
Lebanon would help insure that no meaningful sett Lenient with
4 9Israel could be made without the concurrence of Damascus. 
Along this same line Syria has long endeavored to control the 
PLO based in Lebanon and the Palestinean issue, which it con­
siders very important to its Lebanese and MidcL ?ern
16
ISOstrategy. Such control would presumably accompany domina­
tion of Lebanon.
In January 1976, however, the prospect of a Christian
partition of Lebanon threatened its policies, overruling
hesitations about direct intervention and prompting Syria to
send Palestinean units of its army into Lebanon to tin the
balance away from the Christian militias. The Syrians then
attempted to exploit their new position of dominance to
. . 51impose reforms to end the strife and stabilize Lebanon.
This strategy ran into trouble on several r ,.ts. Many of 
Syria’s traditional allies rejected the reforms as too mod­
erate. The PLO rejected the plan, fearing Syrian hegemony, 
if permanent, would threaten its autonomy. And Syria's Arab
rivals, Lgypt, Iraq, and Libya, opposed any measures which
52would improve Syria’s regional position. Therefore, the 
strategy did not meet with success, and fighting continued 
with the Christian militias, now at a disadvantage, under 
threat of total defeat.
Faced with this prospect, Damascus weighed its options. 
Continued deterioration of tie balance of power might lead 
to an outcome uncontrolled by Syria and defeat the purpose of 
Syria’s original invasion. A Christian defeat could lead to 
the emergence of a radical, possibly pro-Iraqi, Ba’th state 
in Lebanon--a potential threat to Syria. Moreover, allowing 
the situation to go unchecked might result in a loss of 
influence over the PLO. On the other hand, if Syria intervened
17
again it meant a reversal of its traditional alliances, which 
was bound to hurt its Ba'th image and incur resentment at 
home. Faced with these possibilities Damascus opted for the 
latter scenario, initiating another offensive in May and June 
on the side of the Christians. However, due to pressure at 
home and abroad, and to operational failures, the incursion 
was halted short of success; and the Assad regime returned 
to negotiation to resolve the conflict. Under these condi­
tions negotiation soon proved fruitless, and Syria initiated 
yet another incursion in October to break the stalemate.
This time the campaign was successful, but Damascus 
stopped short of a total victory and instead pursued a 
political victory at Riyadh and Cairo for several reasons. 
First, Damascus preferred to be an arbiter between weakened 
but still essentially balanced factions, rather than destroy­
ing its traditional allies and effecting a Christian victory. 
Second, it was under great domestic pressure to negotiate, 
since the regime found it difficult to justify turning on 
its Muslim allies. Third, it was under pressure from other 
Arab states to do so. Those states likewise objected to 
Syrian aggressions against fellow Muslims and wished to 
temper any outcome which wouLd aggrandize Assad's power. 
Lastly, Damascus saw * he possibi lity of obtaining its goals
through political settlement instead; this it did to a great 
53extent.
18
At the October conferences in Riyadh and Cairo Assad
accomplished several goals of his foreign policy in Lebanon.
A cease-fire was arranged which ended most of the fighting;
Syrian hegemony was further "institutionalized and legitimized
by an Arab consensus" through the creation and subsidy of the
Arab Defense Force (ADF), nominally under Lebanese control
but, in fact, a Syrian force to police Lebanon? and finally,
"institutions, instruments, and procedures established , . .
provided the framework within which the Lebanese conflict
54could be contained."
At this point the impetus and resultant policies 
directing Syrian actions in Lebanon were clear, but the 
degree to which these policies were going to succeed had yet 
to be discerned. At a general level Assad's formulation of 
policy in Lebanon after the civil war reflected perceived 
Syrian national interests there and in the Middle East as a 
whole. Yet at a more concrete level policies laid down in 
Damascus increasingly became a pragmatic reaction not only to 
political-strategic realities in Lebanon but also at home in 
Syria and in the region in general. The precarious position 
of the Assad regime domestically and vis-A-vis its neighbors 
increasing became the motivation behind Syrian moves in 
Lebanon throughout the post-civil war period into the 1980s.
Chapter Two: Domestic Parameters of Syrian Foreign Policy
Increasingly Assad*s policies in Lebanon since the 
civil war have been affected by domestic circumstances in 
Syria. This arises from several conditions relating to 
Lebanon. First, as previously discussed, the proximity of 
the two countries makes for considerable contact between the 
populations of the two; so events in Lebanon, especially 
Syrian actions there, are bound to evoke a strong reaction in 
Syria. This factor was particularly important when Syrian 
policies in Lebanon became a point of criticism of the 
regime and when factions in Lebanon lent aid to Assad’s oppo­
sition. Second, Assad’s growing problems at home versus those 
in the region became sources of conflicting stimuli to focus 
the regime's attention simultaneously on the domestic situ­
ation and on Lebanon, making resolution of problems on either 
front difficult. Clearly, then, in order to understand the 
effect of this situation on Assad's policy in Lebanon and 
its impact on events there, one must begin with an under­
standing of Syrian domestic politics.
The structure of ruling regime in Damascus lies at 
the core of domestic problems. The government which devel­
oped after Assad came to power in 1970 combined a military 
oligarchy with a subservient party organization— "an excel­
lent formula for regulating military control of an apparently
19
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cccivilian regime." At the center of the Ba'th Party ruling 
group is Hafez al-Assad, undisputed leader of his own 
coterie* Thus, virtually all the real power of the govern­
ment is concentrated in the person of Assad and his clique# 
which is of predominantly rural and minority origin. In fact# 
Assad himself belongs to the Alawite sect, an offshoot of 
Shiism considered by many to be heretical.
Clearly# the structure itself of the Ba'th regime has 
been the basis for discontent. The rural, minority composi­
tion of the ruling elite perpetuates the refusal of urban 
Sunni population to accept the legitimacy of the regime.
Beside this problem of popular appeal have been recurring 
internecine squabbles since 1970. This latter problem was#
in fact# the reason for the "corrective coup of November 1970
56which brought Assad to power# and a justification for the
charge of disunity and inefficiency by critics of the 
57regime. However# it has remained essentially secondary to 
other problems. As undisputed leader of his own inner circle#
Assad has not been plagued by the problem of heterogeneity#
58as were past regimes. Only recently has there been some 
indication of significant friction within Assad's inner 
circle. It is thought that Assad# whose health has not been 
good of late, is lining up certain people to replace him 
eventually, such as his vice-president Abdel Halim Khaddam
and urother Rifaat Assad; and a dispute has erupted between
59contenders for power.
21
The problem of legitimacy has been exacerbated by the 
continued unwillingness of Assad to risk the coherence an 1 
stability of his regime by diversifying sources of power, 
dimming the chances of making the Ba'th regime acceptable to 
its critics. In the 1970s the regime opted for an inter­
mediate solution: to orgunize the regime at two levels.
Assad and his coterie, army officers, and party functionaries 
remained at the core of the power structure; but through a 
program of reforms initiated in 1973, the core began to work 
through a series of institutions and organizations ’that
would endow the regime with a constitutional and non-partisan 
60appearance." These measures were intended "to create a 
direct link between regime and populace," while simultane­
ously Assad*s personal leadership was emphasized.
At first these reforms created a benign public atmos­
phere and a formal structure within which Syrian politics 
could be conducted. However, the Syrian population was well 
aware that the locus of real power remained at the core of 
the regime, and the more liberal atmosphere made criticism 
of the regime more vocal. “ For example, in February 1973
large demonstrations were held against the proposed draft of
6 3the new permanent constitution.
Beginning in 1976 Syrian policies in Lebanon served 
as a catalyst for growing criticism of the power arrangement 
in Syria. In January 1976 Syria began with indirect, limited 
intervention in Lebanon on the side of its anti-establishment,
22
traditional allies; but in the spring and summer of that year
it dreetly intervened against its allies*, the Palestineans,
Leftists, and Muslim militias, to prevent a total defeat of
the Christians and a potential, collanse of its own policies
in Lebanon. These actions fired up criticism of the regime,
as Assad failed to awince his critics that such actions
were in Line with Syrian fundamental and immediate interests.
Ba'th constituents were distraught over the “ideological
implications of the regimes changes of line, as traditional
foes and allies exchanged roles within a short span of 
64time.” Moreover, radical Ba'this criticized the regime's 
drift away from the Soviet sphere: tensions in Soviet-Syrian
relations were increased by the presentation of the invasion 
as a fait accompli to Soviet Premier Kosygin on the eve of 
his visit to Damascus. On the other hand, large-scale 
attacks on Muslim units in June were seen by the Syrian 
public as an Alawi-Christian alignment against Muslims.
Added to this, the invasion portrayed the regime as ineffi­
cient and disunified duo to internecine fighting over U spousi 
bility for the poor performance in Lebanon. Finally, the
. g5invasion caused “economic and other dis1ocations” to the
Syrian population. The state of stagflation since 1974 was
aggravated by the cost of maintaining a large force in
Lebanon and the flood of refugees into Syria, many of whom
had been Syrian laborers in Lebanon. Also the refugee prob-
6 6lem put more pressure on the Syrian bureaucracy.
23
In the years following Syrian intervention in 1076 
the problems created by direct involvement were not dimin­
ished, and some new problems even arose. The high cost of 
maintaining a contingent in Lebanon continued to put a strain
on the Syrian economy, especially after further conflicts
6 7with the Lebanese Front and Israel in 1978 (and after),
Also, deep involvement in Lebanon continued to preoccupy the 
upper echelons of the army and government, preventing ade­
quate dealing with domestic and regional problems. Moreover, 
high casualties in Lebanon and continued apparent lack of
support for Syria’s traditional allies in Lebanon raised
68resentment at home. Finally, introduction of forces into 
the chaos in Lebanon had a negative effect on the discipline
of the Syrian army where cases of " ’heckpoint extortion and
69general thu<jgcry" iner(>ased.
Meanwhile, developments outside Syria aggravated the
si tun t ion. Jordan, saudi Arabia, t he Lebanese Christ ian
Militias, Iraq, and the Pl,o were accused at various times of
lending aid to militant Sunni opposition in S y r i a . A t  the
same time the Islamic fundamentalist revolution in Iran
71provided an exemplar for Muslims, and m  Syria encouraged
72Sunni critics of the Ba’th regime. On the other side,
Leftist opposition accused the regime of a drift from a
genuine Arab nationalist stance by its continued attempts to
control the PLO and its alleged partnership in an arrangement
73recognizing Israel's military presence in Lebanon. Thus, 
violent attacks against the regime intensified.
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Increasingly, the attention of Damascus turned away
from Lebanon to its own domestic problems. In August 1976
a new cabinet was formed amidst growing criticism of the
government "to improve the economic situation, cleanse
bureaucracy of corruption and inefficiency, and make it more
open and responsive to the wishes of the public."'^ The new
government, however, failed to achieve these goals. Instead,
opposition to the regime became increasingly violent, with
terrorist attacks on the Ba'th elite. By 1980 the regime
was experiencing "wide coordinated disturbances in central
7 5and northern cities" and found it necessary to devote large 
amounts of resources toward fighting the opposition. It 
managed to inflict heavy losses but not defeat on the oppo­
sition. By the 1980s discontent was contained only through 
mass ve repn ssion. For example, in March 1980 troops killed 
hundreds in Aleppo to reimpose government authority, and in 
February 1982 government troops battled elements of the
opposition oup, thi* Muslim Brotherhood, in an uprising in
7 6which * uousands were killed. This atmosphere of greater
radi* a x j zat ion and polarization in politics reversed the
77"openness" of the early 1970s. Partly for these reasons
the Syrian presence in Lebanon was reassessed and the decision
made to redeploy Syrian troops closer to the border beginning
78January 1980.
The shift of attention away fr->m f < hanon and subse­
quent redeployment had several f ue i o o l i c y  implications.
It showed the growing difficulty of mainta ,*g influence in
Lebanon on one hand; and on the other hand, an "unwillingness
and inability to disengage from an arena where some of its
vital interests lay, where it had invested enormous resources
and where it had eventually acquired a position of ascen- 
79uancy,"
The state of Syrian affairs and consequential move 
in Lebanon also had significant impact on affairs in Lebanon. 
The temporary need to divert Syrian attention and resources 
from Lebanon provided the administration in Beirut with 
greater freedom to promote a settlement of the South Leba­
nese problem (discussed later) by Arab summit conference— a
80forum outside Syrian control. The PLO similarly took an
"independent posture" in its European diplomacy and atten-
8 1dance at the Islamabad conference. In the Syrian view the 
redeployment would reassert Syrian control over the Lebanese 
government and its allies, such as the PLO, by raising the 
spectre of renewed civil and making the factions more 
compliant to Syrian wishes in an attempt to induce Syria to 
remain as a policing force. In fact, the redeployment did 
cause renewed fighting between rival factions to fill the 
vacuum in areas where Syrian troops were withdrawn. Simi­
larly, it prompted a Phalangist decision to break the mili­
tary power of the National Liberals ^nd establish its own
8 3supremacy within the Lebanese Front. Thus, the redeploy­
ment facilitated renewed attempts a t national reconciliation 
(which, however, failed) . 84
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From this examination of events during and after the 
Lebanese civil war in 1975 to 1976, a clear causal relation­
ship emerges between domestic politics in Syria, Syrian 
foreign policy, and Lebanese domestic politics. In the view 
of Damascus, Syria's declining position in the region 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s made vital the allo­
cation of the regime's resources and attention toward build­
ing Syria's position in Lebanon and resolving the problem 
there to reverse this decline. However, growing domestic 
opposition to the Assad regime at this time forced it to 
divert its attention and resources increasingly from Lebanon 
to the home front in order to quell opposition, creating a 
dilemma of where to concentrate its time and resources. 
Moreover, the regime found its dilemma complicated because 
its presence in Lebanon was fueling criticism at home, and 
sources in Lebanon were providing aid to Assad's domestic 
opposition. Thus, for these reasons also Damascus recog­
nized the growing imperat i ve to concent rate on its affairs 
in Lebanon. Yet for precisely these reasons it also now 
found itself increasingly unable to do so. Tills debilita­
tion, in turn, had an impact on the course of events in
Lebanon.
Chapter Three: Regional and Global Parameters
of Syrian Policy in Lebanon
In the years following the Lebanese civil war, Syria
continued its efforts to establish, institutionalize, and
perpetuate its own hegemony throughout Lebanon for a variety
of reasons relating to its greater regional policies.
Damascus hoped to build its position in Lebanon through the
accomplishment of several more specific objectives, but as
certain political developments arose within Lebanon and in
the Middle East overall, Syria was forced to modify and shift
its priorities within these objectives. These developments
also affected the success of Assad's policies, and by the
early 1980s the picture in Lebanon with regard to Syria's
position there was greatly changed from what it had been at
the conclusion of the civil war.
Damascus sought to control Lebanon for a variety of
reasons relating to its wider regional foreign policy. The
death of Nasser in 1970 and consequent decline of Egyptian
influence in the region created a political vacuum, which
8 5Assad's foreign policy intended to fill, Specifically,
Syria hoped to establish its own power and influence in the
8 6region it called "Greater Syria." Thus domination in 
Lebanon would be a step in the pursuit of regional suzerainty, 
A Syrian-dominated Lebanon could eventually be an ally against
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Israel. Lebanon could become part of Syria's northeast
front against Israel. Likewise, a strong Syrian position
there as well as control of the PLO could provide political
leverage in negotiations with Israel? and in such a position
Syria could also threaten an escalation of hostilities in
Lebanon at any time for a variety of reasons— for example, to
87sidetrack Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Moreover, Damas­
cus hoped this position of influence and power would impress 
upon the U.S., Israel, and other Arab states its indispensi- 
bility in any future settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Thus, Damascus endeavored to establish itself as undisputed 
master of all Lebanon in order to gain political influence 
in the region and strategic advantage over Israel. Similarly, 
it strove to dominate the Palestinean leadership in order to 
control its operations and settlement of the Palestinean 
issue with Israel.
While building its own position in Lebanon, Syria 
simultaneously sought to keep all other parties in the region 
out and to avoid the potential hazards of involving itself in 
the strife directly. For this reason Damascus tried to 
legitimize its presence through regional recognition of its 
role in Lebanon, welcoming, at the same time, outside funding 
for its operations in Lebanon. This was accomplished at the 
Riyadh and Cairo conferences, in part. Moreover, Syria 
wished to prevent the possible use of Lebanon as a thorough­
fare for attacking Syria. It also sought to prevent strife
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in Lebanon from leading to partition and the emergence of a 
pro-Israeli, Christian state? from inviting Israeli involve­
ment? or from drawing Syria into a war with Israel at the 
wrong time. Also the Assad regime did not want Lebanese 
communal strife from spreading to Syria, where its stability 
might be threatened and a failure to end fighting might be
perceived as a failure of the Ba'th regime, further desta-
8 8bilizing its increasingly tenuous hold. For these reasons 
Damascus felt an increasing imperative by the mid-1970s to 
establish its own hegemony in a Lebanon reconstituted to its 
liking.
Several factors nonetheless prevented the success of 
this strategy and led to i decline of Syrian influence in 
Lebanon and in the region in the 1970s and beginning of the 
1980s, and caused a corresponding deterioration of its posi­
tion in the Arab-Israeli conflict. On a general level 
Lebanon was difficult to isolate from the politics of the 
region. Rival Arab states, such as Iraq and Egypt, often 
opposed Syrian policies in Lebanon, because they might 
aggrandize Syrian power and influence. Israel resisted 
attempts by Syria to gain an advantage, especially in South 
Lebanon, for strategic reasons. Lebanon was also a battle­
ground for larger rivalries and conflicts of ideology in the
8 9Arab world and between the superpowers. Thus, the other 
actors in the area resisted attempts by Syria to bring 
Lebanon completely within its own purview.
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Syrian actions in the Lebanese civil war in 1976 had 
aggravated opposition to its policies at home and abroad, 
but certain other developments in the region later in the 
1970s and early 1980s also forced Assad to modify Syria*s 
course in Lebanon.
Among these factors was Syria’s relations with Iraq.
Ov#r the past ten years, they had been generally hostile, 
except for a brief period in 1978. As a result of these 
hostilities Iraq lent aid to certain factions ' Lebanon in 
opposition to Syria, such as the Arab Liberal i Front and 
the pro-Iraqi wing of the Lebanese Ba*th Party. Syria, in 
turn, tried to counter with support of pro-Syrian and anti- 
Iraqi forces in Lebanon, such as the Shiite militia Amal, 
and imposed censorship on pro-Iraqi news agencies in Lebanon. 
Iraq also cut off revenue to Syria through the shutdown of 
its oil pipeline to Tripoli in 1977, which deteriorated the 
economy, already ailing, in part, because of the expenditure 
of maintaining its forces in Lebanon, exacerbating domestic
90troubles.
Syria had hoped to redress the perceived strategic 
imbalance vis-&-vis Israel, created after Israeli-Egyptian 
negotiations were initiated, with a brief attempt at recon­
ciliation with Iraq? but tensions soon increased, and Syria
91began accusing Iraq of aiding its opposition at home.
Finally, in September 1980 war broke out between Iran and 
Iraq. In the past Iran’s Isalamic fundamentalism and proximity
31
to Syria had been a concern to Assad*s Ba*th regime# causing
uneasy relations; but the onset of the Iran-Iraq War and
renewed Syrian-Iraqi hostility found Damascus in a new
alliance with Tehran against Iraq, This had inevitable
repercussions in Lebanon. For example# the Shiite community#
inspired by the revolution in Iran, now asserted itself even
92more forcefully in its political stance? and Amal now
received the backing of Damascus in fighting against pro-
93Iraqi Palestinean forces# straining Assad’s relations with 
the Palestinean organizations.
Another event with possible repercussions in Lebanon 
was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The 
immediate effect of this action was to divert Arab attention 
from the Arab-Israel political process. Likewise# it put 
Syria and Saudi Arabia along with Jordan at opposite ends of 
the political spectrum. Building opposition to the U.S.- 
sponsored, Israeli-Egyptian peace talks was very central to 
Syrian foreign policy? this and Syria's now close alignment 
with the U S.S.R. led Damascus to oppose Saudi Arabia's and 
Jordan's attempts to refocus Arab attention on building sup­
port for measures against the Soviets. Syria's opposition 
then drove the Saudis and Jordanians even closer to the 
Iraqis, with whom they had recently aligned against Syria
because of the revolution in Iran and Syrian support for 
94Khomeini. The first indicator of this came at the Tunis 
95conference. Therefore, partly as an attempt to refocus
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Arab attention away from Afghanistan, the Syrians began a 
redef luyment of troops in Lebanon early in 1980. They hoped
this move, which seemed radical at the time, would recapture
, 96the concerns of the Arab countries.
In the Arab world the development perhaps most impor­
tant for Syria's Lebanese policy was Anwar Sadat's peace 
initiative with Israel in 1977. With regard to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, Syria had alv/ays stressed Syrian-Egyptian 
cooperation (among others) as a strategic and political 
balance against Israel. With Egypt's move toward peace with 
Israel, Syria became greatly concerned about the imbalance' 
with Israel, making it even more imperative that it build its 
influence and strategic position in the immediate surround­
ings, especially in Lebanon, to redress the imbalance. How­
ever, at the same time Syrian domestic unrest made it diffi­
cult for the ruling regime to concentrate its efforts outside 
Syria.
Jordan presented the possibility of an alignment to
offset Israeli power, but relations with Jordan became, at
the least, difficult after they reached a high point around
1977. Jordan's King Hussein had a similar strategy for
domination of the imme Mate region, which put Amman's poli-
97cies in conflict with those of Damascus. As a means of 
weakening Syria's position Jordan often took stands opposing 
Assad. For example, Jordan supported Iraq against fvria 
after 1979. Finally, tensions culminated in a military
face-of f on the Syrian-Jordan i.an border in 1980. In response 
to Jordan's support for Iraq i;*d alleged support for Assad’s 
opposition in Syria, Assad drew Syrian army divisions up to 
the border in November as a threat. Here1 Lebanon entered 
the picture indirectly: due t j Syrian troop coiumitments in
Lebanon and at home, Assad was unable - bring the full force 
of his military might against Jordan. As a result the threat 
failed, and Assad pulled back. Relations with Amman hit a 
new low, and the chances of a Syrian-Jordaniai united front 
against Israel all but disappeared. Moreover, the prospect 
that Jordan might eventually abandon Syria’s side in its 
opposition to the peace process made domination of Lebanon 
even more important to Damascus, along with control of the 
Palestinean organizations and the Palestinean issue. As a 
result Syrian policies became more aggressive and sharpened 
competition with Israel for influence in South Lebanon.
By 1980 Syria found itself isolated in the Aral world 
and alone attempting to maintain a strategic balance with 
Israel. In the mid-1970s Damascus had sought to swing its 
alignment with the superpowers from the Soviets to a more 
centrist policy, recognizing, as had Egypt, the ability of 
the U.S. to pressure Israel on the issue of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. They thus began to emphasize direct relations 
with Washington, and the U.S. often took the role of medi­
ator in preventing Syrian-Tsraeli face-offs in Lebanon from 
degenerating into total war.^^ Increasingly, however,
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Syrian d< m ost , c troubles, compounded by t Ik* costly commitment 
in Lot-anon rd isolation in the Aral world# drove Syria into 
the Soviet orbit. Finally, as a measure of the closeness of 
this re!at ionshi p Damascus concluded a Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation with Moscow in October 1980.*^
As the Assad ! qime entered the 198 0s it found itself 
in u ve; , itf icult uosi t ion. Domestically, it had survived 
<Mily through brute force, and the increased need to deal with 
domestic troubles was a major cause of its decline of 
interest and influence in Lebanon. Additionally, it had not 
as yet succeeded in bringing about national reconciliation, 
nor had it managed to completely control the government in 
Beirut or the PLO--or even the whole of Lebanese territory. 
Instead, it was forced to maintain a large, costly presence 
in Lebanon to insure its position and counterbalance Israeli 
influence in South Lebanon. In the rest of the region 
Assad*s regime was also isolated for a variety of reasons 
and left alone to redress the strategic imbalance with Israel, 
making competition between the two in South Lebanon even 
sharper. Finally, while Syria had hoped for more direct, 
closer relations with the U.S. to pressure Israel, it found 
itself more closely linked to the U.S.S.R. than ever before 
for precisely all these reasons.
Chapter Four: Syrian Involvement in Lebanon 1976-1982
The same motives which accounted for Syrian actions 
in Lebanon between 1975 and 1976 directed policies there in 
the postwar period. Ultimately they derived from the desire 
to establish suzerainty there. In concrete terms the Assad 
regime "sought to consolidate, institutionalize, and per­
petuate its influence in Lebanon by relying on the presence 
of its troops; by direct occupation of eastern and northern 
Lebanon; by ensuring the cooperation of President Sarkis 
and by gradually expanding central administration? and by 
encouraging cooperation among other local political forces." 
Furthermore, in accomplishing this, Damascus hoped to avoid 
using force and "to discourage manifestations of open uppnsi 
tion to its policies in Lebanon, and in the Arab World."
While the inter-Arab conferences at Riyadh and Cairo
ended the worst of the fighting in October 1976, the con-
10*1flict did not end but continued in "a more muted form'1
over issues such as political reforms, the Palestinean
105presence, and the problem in South Lebanon. A balance
had been reached for the time being in Lebanon, but not 
through a <esclution of the conflict, only a Syrian-induced 
stalemate. In ♦'he aftermath the factions in Lebanon
realigned roughly into three camps: the pro-status quo
coalition represented by the Lebanese Front, the anti-status
102
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quo camp known as the National Movement, and an intermediate
. 107splinter group known as the "Central Camp."
The Lebanese Front, which was composed mainly of the 
Phalangists and National Liberals, did not vocalize strong 
objections to the Syrian military presence. In fact, with 
the exception of a few vigorous critics of Syrian involvement, 
such as Maronite politician Raymond Edde, protests from 
Christian leaders in general were very limited. Moreover, 
although there were rumors of a Syrian-Leftist and Syrian- 
Palestinean rapprochement, and in spite of a rise in tensions 
between Christians and the Syrians, the Front generally 
recognized the need to cooperate with Damascus to get the 
best possible settlement, in view of the latter's new posi­
tion of ascendancy in Lebanon for the foreseeable future.
Thus, although it came out in favor of dispersing the 
Palestinean population in Lebanon throughout the other Arab 
states, the Lebanese Front only pushed for action to implement 
the Cairo agreement and later political dialogue to establish
greater autonomy for Lebanon's various communities and
108greater economic justice. The result was that relations
between the Lebanese Front and Syria grew increasingly tense 
but remained superficially peaceful until the end of 1977.
Within the Lebanese Front a great deal of restraint 
was required by Pierre Gemayel to keep less compromising 
elements, such as Camille Chamoun, from challenging the 
Syrian presence. Thus, for example, Chamoun ultimately
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accepted the presence of Syrian troops in Christian areas and 
the appointment of a new commander to the Lebanese army, as 
Gemayel understood the Syrians would not hesitate to use 
force if necessary, and that external help would not be 
forthcoming.
The National Movement was composed of the Muslim 
militias, Palestinean organizations, and the Left led by 
Walid Jumblat (who also took over as head of the Progressive 
Socialist ^arty after his father Kamal*s assassination). 
Weakened by the civil war and confrontation with Syria, the 
National Movement came cut for political compromise to end 
fighting, but with several qualifications. These included a 
restoration of unity in Lebanon with broad reforms and a 
recognition of the Palestinean right to operate in Lebanon.
A more radical version, which came from a splinter group of 
the National Movement, denounced the "Lebanese Right'* for 
attempting to "partition Lebanon in collusion with Israel"'*'^ 
and of pressuring Syrian forces to destroy the Palestineans.*
The Central Camp was "a loose collection of moderate
11°-•nd pro-Syrian parties, personalities and forces." “ It 
included the Islamic Alignment, a collection of Sunni zu'ama, 
Muslim religious leaders, Nasserites, and the pro Syrian 
Ba'th, which had split from the National Movement in 1976.
The groups shared in support for political negotiations, for 
President Sarkis, and generally for Syrian policy in Lebanon. 
In fact, Damascus hoped to make this camp the center of a
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"Broad National Front,” which was to be "the local political
base for its own policies and those of Sarkis,” This,
however, remained nothing more than a goal, and these
leaders limited themselves to visits to Syria, meetings with
Sarkis, and pronouncements on the political situation. When
the National Front was actually established in September 1977,
it included only the Progressive Socialist Party and the
Lebanese Ba'th Socialist Party; while other members of the
114Center condemned it as a surrender to the Syrians.
As for the administration of Ilyas Sarkis, it seemed
resigned to Syrian control and chose to cooperate with
115Damascus for the most part. Syria, in turn, saw the
Sarkis cabinet as "an instrument for exercising and main-
11 ctaining its influence in Lebanon," so it set about the
task of reconstituting the government for the remainder of
1171976 and 1977. This included formation of a new cabinet
under Salim al-Huss (a confidant of Sarkis) and reorganiza­
tion of the army with a new pro^Syrian command, which Syria 
ultimately hoped to use to police the South and implement the 
Cairo agreement. In addition, some economic reconstruction 
was undertaken but was slow in producing results. Finally, 
the Syrians saw to the emplacement of press censorship. This
last measure was intended to mute critics of Syria's policies,
118especially pro-Iraqi newspapers.
Syria's policy toward the Palestinean organizations 
was ambivalent. At Riyadh Assad renounced the aim of crushing
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the PLO leadership and instead recognized its position. 
Likewise, he defended the PLO when it came under strong 
attack by the Christian militias. On the other hand,
Damascus continued the long-standing policy aim of attempt­
ing to subordinate the Palestinean organizations to its 
authority, for example, taking strategic positions around 
the refugee camps. Against this background Damascus sought 
a mo<3us vivendi with the Palestineans and to this end ini­
tiated the Shtura conference in July 1977, The resultant 
agreement dealt with control of the refugee camps and heavy 
weapons, and the problem of the South, which subsequently
overshadowed the other considerations, due to intensifying
119fighting there.
In 1978 certain developments began to change the
nature of the conflict in Lebanon. Foremost among them was
a change in Syrian policies, favoring more forceful exertion
of power in Lebanon to expedite the expansion of its control,
which had as yet failed to bring about Syria's overall aims.
This policy modification was motivated by certain factors
inside and outside Lebanon. For example, the commencement
of Israeli-Egyptian peace talks prompted a Syrian-PLO
rapprochement and resultant exacerbation of tensions between
120Syria and the Lebanese Front. Tensions had begun to
manifest themselves as early as 1977 and intensified through­
out 1978. For example, in December 1977 armed clashes 
between the ADF and Phalangists occurred in Beirut after the
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closing of an anti-Syrian newspaper. In January to February 
1978 elements of the Lebanese army and National Liberals 
battled the ADF in Beirut, In April after intervention by 
the ADF between Muslims and Christians in Beirut, the 
Syrians were accused of shelling East Beirut* Then after the 
killing of Tony Franjieh in June 1978 (by Phalangists), 
relations between the Syrian’s and Lebanese front reached a 
low point. Finally, in July the Syrians attacked the Pha­
langists and National Liberals in East Beirut to break their 
power, and in August fighting shifted to northern Lebanon.
Another development beginning in 1973 related prin­
cipally to Israeli policy in South Lebanon. The South had 
been relatively free of fighting in the civil war until the 
summer of 1976 when fighting erupted between the Lebanese 
Arab Army and the local Christian militias, and then intensi­
fied as Palestinean units which had gone north to fight 
returned after the fall of Tall al-Za'tar in August 1976.
This fighting continued throughout 1977, either initiated by 
the Palestinean and leftist "Joint Forces" (in reality,
nearly completely of Palestinean composition ) or the
. 122 three Christian enclaves led by Major Sa'ad Haddad. While
Haddad emphasized his affiliation with the Lebanese army and
the intercommunal mix of his force, his enclave was, in fact,
linked to the Lebanese Front in the North and supported by 
123Israel.
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A major outburst of fighting occurred in spring and 
summer 1977. Initiated by the Christian militias to estab­
lish territorial congruity between the enclaves, the Pales- 
tineans and Syrians saw these moves as an attempt to create
a buffer along the Israeli-Lebanese border and to extend
124Israeli influence. In the Syrian-aided, Palestinean
counter-offensive the Christians were threatened with total 
collapse, but Syria restrained them and helped bring about a 
cease-fire. This they did out of concern that total Pales­
tinean victory would further deteriorate the condition or
12 5prompt Israeli intervention. Shortly thereafter fighting
was agair. instigated by the Christian militias to prevent the
continue! influx of Palestineans into the area; to improve
the Christian morale; and to force Israel to back up assur-
12 6ances of greater support with actions. Finally, after the
failure to implement solutions to the problem, fighting
recurred at the end of the summer, and Israeli forces crossed
the border to aid the Christians. This round of fighting
ended with a cease-fire on September 25, 1977 following
127American mediation.
The most basic reason for continued conflict in the 
South was not the presence of the Palestinean organizations 
there, but the fact that this conflict took place in a power 
vacuum which resisted filling. In view of the area's stra­
tegic proximity to the Israeli border, both Israel and Syria 
refused to allow any measures by the other in the region which
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would improve the other’s position, such as the introduction 
of troops to police the region. Thus, the Syrians supported 
the Palestineans, and the Israelis supported the Christian 
militias through mostly indirect means. At the same time 
Syria would not allow the Palestineans to achieve total vic­
tory out of fear of provoking Israeli intervention. The
128result was a perpetuation of conflict in the South.
The reasons for Syrian and Israeli actions were stra­
tegic. The moving force behind Israeli actions in the South 
was their "good fence" policy. This entailed material sup­
port for the Christian militias in the area and certain ser­
vices for the indigenous population to build a degree of good 
will. It was hoped this policy would prevent a return of the 
Palestineans to this region and a resumption of terrorist 
infiltration across the border. The Israelis also declared 
a vague "red line" across southern Lebanon, beyond which the 
presence of Syrian troops was considered a strategic threat 
to Israel. Thus their policy was designed to create a sphere
of influence and a buffer zone against the Palestineans and
129Syrians along the Lebanese-Israeli border.
The Syrians, on the other hand, wanted to close the 
"good fence" and end Israeli influence in South Lebanon, and 
to extend their own influence into the border region to use 
as military and political leverage against Israel and to 
improve their overall position in Lebanon. At the same time 
they were aware of the danger of an Israeli incursion and so
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discouraged it by restraining the Palestineans from complete 
victory.
Due to this adversarial relationship attempts to fill
the vacuum or regulate the actions of the parties to the
conflict were bound to fail— and they did. For example, in
January to February 1977 Syrian troops entered the town of
Nabatiya, which the Israelis protested was beyond the "red
line." After U.S. mediation the parties agreed to a phased 
131withdrawal. Suggestions to fill the vacuum through the
introduction of a U.N. peacekeeping force in the South by
Camille Chamoun and others were rejected by the Syrians, who
suspected an independent element in Lebanon might give the
132factions some autonomy from Syria. Likewise, proposals to
dispatch Lebanese army units to the area were rejected. One 
such proposal was made at the Shtura conference, initiated by 
the Syrians in an attempt to regulate the operations of the 
Palestinean organizations. The agreement called for a 
Palestinean withdrawal from most areas to a distance of fif­
teen kilometers from the Israeli border and replacement by 
ADF and Lebanese army units. Implementation was overridden 
by objections by the Christian militias, who announced peace 
only after the deparcure of the Palestinean forces from all 
areas of the South. Moreover, some Palestinean group 
objected to departing; and Israel objected on the grounds 
that the agreement would institutionalize the Palestinean 
presence and that it would extend Syria's control too close
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to the border, since the Lebanese army had yet to be satis­
factorily reconstituted. Thus, the Shtura agreement failed,
133and fighting subsequently broke out (September 1977).
Begininng in 1978 Israel modified its policy in South 
Lebanon, intensifying the conflict there and forcing Syria to 
make corresponding policy changes. This new Israeli policy 
followed a strategy of using military offensives into the 
South to alleviate the problem of Palestinean raids from
134Lebanon rather than simply in retaliation for such actions.
Thus, in March 1978 the Israelis began a massive military
offensive to the Litani River, known as the "Litani Opera- 
135tion." At the same time they indicated they wished to
avoid direct conflict with Syria and that their presence 
would be temporary.
Assad's policy became more aggressive in response, yet 
retained a measure of caution, making clear the desire like­
wise to avoid uncontrolled hostilities with Israel. Although 
the Syrians did not commit troops to the fighting they did 
initiate some antiaircraft fire and allowed passage through 
Syria of all who wished to fight the Israelis, as some 
Iraqis did. Moreover, Assad sought to improve Syria's posi­
tion by suggesting placement ADF units in the South to 
police the area; or in lieu of that, he supported the intro­
duction of a U.N. force to expedite Israeli withdrawal. This
was, in fact, what occurred, and by June 13, 1978 Israeli
137forces were replaced by U.N. forces.
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Increasingly, the problems of South preoccupied the
actors in Lebanon, including the Sarkis government, which
saw the South as a major impediment to the resolution of
138Lebanon’s overall problems. At the same time, however
the Assad regime’s overall attention to and influence in 
Lebanon decreased due to several factors, in luding domestic
1 3 »>troubles and a regional decline of Syria's position. Per­
ceiving the decline of Syrian interest, the Lebanese govern­
ment exerted greater independence from Damascus in solving
140the problem of the South. This was most apparent in the
Sarkis administration's insistence on putting the issue of 
South Lebanon on the agenda of the Tunis conference in 
November 1979, over Syrian objections. At the same time
Sarkis drew up a plan to send Lebanese troops to the South,
but this plan encountered the same obstacles as had previous
plans to interpose a policing force in the Southern power
vacuum. Palestinoan organisations opposed a force which
142might limit their freedom to operate in the area. Like­
wise, Anu*r i t \ m  and French proposals to increase the presence
1 *i 3of Lebanese and I’.N. Torres were rejected. ‘ Therefore, as 
liopo; shiMod toward the I'uni:, summit, the Sarkis government 
propai od t sot o! pujMis.il :> tor t ,o eon! ei enoe which were
t1' doi so : bv 1o idoi ; .>
\ n < w i I 1 i a«•«• with t ho i o v * r r urn * n * .
t ho o b i * t o  • :ommun1t y , who had formed 
» 4 4
T h e s e  11 r o } xj s a l s  w o u 1 d
s j . o  i i ' i i s : d i,» - h . i m - s t • a o t  h o t  , * y  , j ini  * t o* »j -n t h r o u g h o u t  t h e
* t i < • t no Fa i o:-.»t i i». ar. au rat ions against
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Israel from Lebanon. The proposals were rejected by
Syria, which, instead, endorsed Palestinean proposals to
cooperate with the Lebanese government in exchange for the
146latter’s respect for the Cairo agreement and its annexes.
The result of the conference was a set of resolu­
tions which were a compromise of the two sides, recognizing 
Lebanese sovereignty and calling for extension of its forces 
to the South, while, at the same titae, recognizing the right 
of Palestineans to operate there. In addition, the resolu­
tions condemned Israeli influence and pledged money for
147reconstruction of Lebanon. Following previous patterns,
the resolutions concerning the South were not implemented, 
since the factions failed to accept them. The Lebanese 
government rejected the notion of Palestinean armed forces 
in the South, while the Syrians did not share these reser­
vations. Likewise, the Palestineans would not accept the 
imposition of a force which would restrict their actions.
Finally, the Lebanese Front, for its part, vowed to fight
148until the Palestinean armed presence was gone.
Amidst these failures the Syrians began a redeploy­
ment of their troops in January 1980, reconcentrating them 
in the Bekaa Valley. There were several reasons for the 
action. Primarily, increased domestic strife in Syria
necessitated moving troops closer to the border in order to
149draw reinforcements from Lebanon more quickly. Also, the 
move may have been designed to draw Arab attention away from
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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and refocus it on the 
Arab-Israeli political process (simultaneously doing the 
Soviets a service). Strategically, the move may have also 
been made to tighten up the Syrian line of defense against 
a potential Israeli attack, made more likely due to a rise 
in tensions between the two at the time. With regard to
the Palestineans, the redeployment was probably an attempt 
by Damascus to "reaffirm its control over the PLO by inte­
grating it into the Syrian-dominated peacekeeping struc- 
151ture." This was in response to the recent "independent
posture of the PLO in conducting European diplomacy as well
as by attending the Islamabad conference" without previous
152Syrian consultation.
Within the Lebanese context, the pullout was designed 
to raise the spectre of renewed civil war in order to dis­
courage the new independent policies of the Lebanese govern­
ment by stressing its dependence on the Syrian presence.
And it was meant to exert pressure on all parties to resume
153efforts at national reconciliation. Thus, the moves were
designed to reverse the regime's decline of influence in
Lebanon and ultimately in the region, and to realize its
policy aims of ending strife and consolidating Syrian hege- 
154mony.
As redeployment began in January 1980 Syrian units 
were replaced primarily by these of the Palestine Liberation 
Army and the Lebanese Arab Army. At the same time, however,
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the Lebanese army prepared to take these positions, leading
155to clashes in some places, such as Sidon. Fighting also
occurred in West Beirut between Leftists and Palestineans,
prompting a decision to delay the troop withdrawal and
pressure by Damascus for national reconciliation. Clashes
also took place in the north between Phalangists and
Franjieh's Giants, and in Beirut between Amal and Palestinean
units. Nevertheless, the redeployment was completed in March
with most Syrian positions left to ^alestinean units and a
few to the Lebanese army, Syrian troops, however, remained
in Beirut and subsequently returned to some other cities to
156separate rival factions. Between March and July 1980
Damascus concentrated its efforts on achieving national 
reconciliation and a formal defense treaty with the Lebanese 
government, which would allow a reduction in Syria's costly 
troop commitment there. In both efforts Damascus failed,
157although it did tighten its control of the Lebanese army.
In trying to bring about a solution to the Lebanese
conflict and to build its base of support, Syria continued to
expand its alliance with pro-Syrian elements in Lebanon,
while it did nothing to heal the rift with the Lebanese
Front created by earlier clashes. However, in the winter and
spring of 1980 it modified its Lebanese policy and opened
dialogue with elements in the Front, particularly the Pla-
158langists, to expand its support base. Relations did, in
fact, warm up temporarily as a result but reached an impasse
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by the summer of 1980 over issues such as the armed Pales- 
tinean presence and Israel’s support for the Front. Subse­
quently, the attempt at rapprochement was overshadowed by 
conflict within the Front between Phalangists and National 
Liberals, initiated by the former in July to gain control of 
the Lebanese Front. After significant fighting in Beirut and
to the north the Liberals surrendered leaving the Phalangists
159"undisputed masters of the Lebanese Front." Thereafter
the views of the Phalangists became the views of the Front, 
especially with regard to their uncompromising attitude
160toward the Palestineans, and their support from Israel.
In addition, leaders of the Lebanese Front took a new tack 
in opening talks with Soviets, in the hope of using them to 
pressure the Syrians and Palestineans in negotiations,
At the other end of the spectrum the gap was closing 
between the National Movement and the National Front, which 
had a pro-Syrian bent. As the differences between the two 
diminished, differences within each increased, leading to 
organizational changes and internecine conflict. Ultimately,
the National Front disbanded due to desertions to the
162National Movement and secessions.
Another significant change in the Lebanese political
scene at this time was the growing involvement and importance
of the Shiite community and its militia Amal, led by Nabih 
163Berri. For many years the Shiites, who were politically 
inactive, remained irrelevant in Lebanese politics,
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reflecting their position at the bottom of the socio-economic 
ladder. Until the 1960s they were dominated by the zu'ama 
or traditional political bosses. But in the 1960s there 
emerged a leadership, especially that of Musa al-Sadr, which 
politicized the Shiites and united them against the political 
bosses. The civil war in 1975 halted their politicization 
and increased their militarization. After the war the move­
ment consolidated and was invigorated by several develop­
ments: the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which was a "spur to
164action" to Shiites? the new Israeli strategy of alienating 
the Lebanese from the Palestineans initiated by the Litani 
Operation, which succeeded in turning the Shiites against 
the Palestineans, and impressed upon the Shiites the need for 
security? and the disappearance of the leader Musa al-Sadr
in 1979, which made him a hero and model for Shiites,
165inspiring their unity. These factors were behind tensions
between Shiites and the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Force as
well as between them and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Lebanese
Ba'th. The result was fighting between these groups in
February and May 1980 in which Damascus backed the Shiites—
a reflection of Syria's new alliance with Iran and renewed
conflict with Iraq.^^^ In response to these clashes the PLO
and Lebanese Left moved closer together, and the National
Movement attempted to co-opt the Shiites, although these
167measures failed to dampen the conflict.
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While the Shiites were involved in military con­
flicts with certain factions, politically they called for 
greater representation in a restructured government giving 
greater weight to their numbers, not a complete overthrow of
the system. This explained their temporary alliance with
168the Lebanese government at this time.
Such was the dtatus quo in Lebanon entering the 1980s. 
Syria continued its efforts to consolidate its position and 
to bring about national reconciliation, while preventing 
sporadic outbursts between the numerous rival factions from 
degenerating into civil war again. This was done by attempt­
ing to institutionalize its relationship with the Lebanese 
government, expanding its base of support, regulating the 
Palestineans, pressuring groups to negotiate, and, in the 
absence of success, by utilizing its military forces.
In the early 1980s the regime in Damascus found itself 
in a precarious and continually deteriorating position on 
all fronts. At home Assad had managed to quell his opposi­
tion— at least temporarily— through severe brutality, but 
there was still no solution to the regime's growing unpopu­
larity; nor was the Syrian economy faring well, due, in part, 
to Assad's costly troop commitment in Syria and Lebanon. In 
the region as a whole Damascus found its political-strategic 
position slipping. Tensions with Israel were greater and 
had repeatedly led to limited conflicts in Lebanon. More­
over, Syria had failed to make alliances with its Arab
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neighbors to repair the strategic imbalance it perceived 
after Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty. In fact,
Syria was now more isolated in the Arab community than before. 
These developments made ever more imperative, in Syria's view, 
a solution to Lebanon's problems and the establishment of 
undisputed hegemony there, in order to improve Syria's 
political-strategic position vis-^-vis Israel and its Arab 
neighbors; to reduce its troop commitment; and to reconcen­
trate the regime's attentions elsewhere. Yet for precisely 
the same reasons the regime was forced to divert its resources 
and attention from the Lebanese arena, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of finding a solution, ^nd encouraging the actors 
in Lebanon to assert greater independence from the policies 
of Damascus.
Chapter Fives Syrian Involvement in Lebanon after 1982
In June 1982 a large-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
presented both potential hazards and opportunities for Syria's 
foreign policy. The effect of the Israeli presence in Lebanon 
and support for a Phalangist-led government in Beirut was to 
polarize the anti-status quo elements and to drive them into 
the Syrian camp. At last Damascus found its broad base of 
support, albeit for pragmatic reasons. It could then use its 
base to destroy the pro-Israeli Phalangist government and 
ultimately bring about a "Pax Syriana." Moreover, Israeli 
operations against the PLO facilitated Syrian measures to 
establish complete control over the organization. On the 
other hand, the introduction of a host of other actors 
directly onto the Lebanese scene threatened to loosen Syrian 
control of the outcome. Now the Israelis were involved in 
Lebanon more directly and to a greater extent than ever 
before. The United States and other European powers also had 
a direct stake in Lebanon; and the U.S.S.R. had a much 
greater although still essentially indirect position. Even 
other Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, became more closely 
associated with the situation.
In June 1982 Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in "Oper­
ation Peace for Galilee" ostensibly to remove the PLO from 
southern Lebanon as a threat to Israel. The continued
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advance to Beirut, however, soon made apparent Israeli pur­
poses. They were to get the PLO out of Lebanon and destroy 
it as a political and military force, and to aid in the 
establishment of a stable, pro-Israeli government led by the 
Phalangists which would ultimately become the second Arab 
state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. By May 1983
they appeared, by and large, to have accomplished these 
tasks. A government was formed under Bashir Gemayel, who was 
then assassinated and replaced by his brother Amin. In 
September 1982 U.S. marines assisted in the evacuation of
8000 Palestinean guerillas from Beirut to other Arab coun- 
170tries. And on May 17, 1983 an agreement which came close
to being a peace treaty was negotiated between Israel and 
Lebanon without Syrian involvement. The agreement called for 
a withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, normalized rela­
tions between the two states, and gave Israel special rights
171in South Lebanon. The results of the invasion instead
proved to be infinitely more complex, especially where 
Damascus was concerned.
For Syrian policy the Israeli invasion and its after- 
math had several consequences. First, Israel succeeded in 
destroying Syria*s Soviet-supplied air defense system and
17 2most of its air force, humiliating Syria and the Soviets.
This prompted Damascus to rebuild its defenses with Soviet 
equipment to a significantly more threatening level (to 
Israel and U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean), and
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success of which policy makers thought would build American
prestige in the reqion and thereby facilitate the goal of
its larger Middle East policy: an end to the Arab-Israeli
conflict and a more stable Middle East outside Moscow*s
178sphere of influence. In its haste to reap the benefits
of success Washington conceived a policy within which were 
contained flaws ultimately leading to the failure of U.S. 
oolicy in Lebanon. Specifically, while seeking the with­
drawal of all foreign forces in Lebanon, the U.S. sought to 
^reserve the largely unpopular status quo: Ma democratic
L<*banon--safely in the control of the minority, pro-Western
17 9Christian faction." U.S. policy was constrained by its
ncirrow m .*w of the Lebanese conflict: one primarily within
i h. Last-West context, which drove /Assad and his Lebanese 
allies closer to Moscow, "making America’s conception a 
sell fulfilling prophecy." Instead of recognizing the
indigenous causes for the Lebanese conflict, Washington 
blamed the Soviets and their alleged proxies for the troubles 
in Lebanon. Thus, from the outset the U.S. role was not 
really one of peacekeener bu one of pro-status quo partisan 
--a status quo the Gemayel government gave its opposition 
increasing impetus to overthrow. Moreover, as an ally of the 
Lebanese government, the U.S. became the target of increasing 
attacks, culminating with one in which 241 Marines were killed 
by a truck bomb explosion on October 23, 1983.^^ Constrained 
by the label of Phalangist supporter, Washington found it
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could not effectively perform the role of mediator necessary
to end the conflict. Thus, it could only support the
increasingly unpopular Lebanese government, as opposition
polarized and mobilized against it under Syrian tutelage.
Finally, in February 1984, amidst total chaos in Lebanon,
President Reagan ordered the Marines redeployed offshore
182under intense election-year political pressure. For a
short time after, the U.S. attempted to use offshore artil­
lery against antigovernment positions to replace the Marine
183presence, but this proved largely ineffective. There­
after, Washington withdrew from an active role in the con­
flict, refocusing its attention on the issue of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. Moreover, soon after the other contingents 
of the Multinational Force followed suit in removing their 
forces.
For the various factions in Lebanon several factors
relating to the Israeli invasion and its aftermath drove
them toward Syrian tutelage and unity against the Gemayel
government. First, at the outset the American commitment to
the Gemayel government gave the latter sufficient confidence
to feel it no longer needed national consensus to rule, and
it therefore showed great inflexibility in national recon-
184ciliation talks toward the end of 1983. Second, as hos­
tilities escalated, so did American retaliation against 
warring factions, such as the Dru.se and Shiites; and, 
increasingly, a Phalangist-American alliance against the other
58
communities was perceived. Third, after Bashir Gemayel
was assassinated in September 1982, his brother Amin replaced
him. Unlike his brother, Amin was less able to control his
own faction; and Phalangist hostilities against the other
factions reflected on Amin's government, further decreasing
186its popular appeal. Fourth, events made apparent the
distinct preference for the Christian population by the
Israelis in their areas of occupation. For example, the
Israelis allowed Phalangists to enter the Palestinean camps
of Sabra and Shati.la to search for weapons and did nothing
to stop them from killing 700 to 800 occupants. Moreover,
increased confrontation between Israel and Muslim factions,
such as the Shiites, underscored their growing impatience .
with Israeli occupation and the intransigence of the Gemayel 
187government. Finally, with Syria determined to overthrow
the Gemayel government, the Israelis withdrew from the Shouf
Mountain area around Beirut in September 1983 for security
reasons, leaving a vacuum in which all-out civil war recurred
between Phalangists, Lebanese army units, and their oppo- 
18 8nents. This further strengthened Assad's leadership,
since now even more the factions needed weapons and support
18 9to wage a successful fight.
Fighting continued in 1983 and into 1984 with the 
Lebanese army steadily losing ground to the Syrian-backed 
forces. In early February 1984 Shiite and Druse militias 
took over West Beirut, and in the ensuing fighting between
18 5
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them and the Christian militias, Beirut was divided as it had
been in the civil war in 1975 and 1976. The ’’Green Line,”
a series of checkpoints and barricades, went up, physically
cutting the city in two. Meanwhile, the capacity of the
U.S. to affect events in Lebanon diminished as shelling of
Syrian and antigovernment forces increased. In an implicit
recognition of the failure of U.S. policy, President Reagan
finally ordered the withdrawal of U.S. Marines in Lebanon,
191blaming Syria for Lebanon's ills. Furthermore, the U.S.
began distancing itself from events in Lebanon, shifting
justification for offshore firing into Lebanon from support
192of the Lebanese army to protection of its marines.
Instead, the State Department returned to che wider issue of
Arab-Israeli peace and Reagan's peace plan of September
193 1982. J
To that end, events in Lebanon have accomplished a 
great deal for Syria. In view of Assad's new preeminent 
position in the region and America's loss of credibility as 
a mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace process, efforts to 
bring about negotiations on that subject became more diffi­
cult. In March, shortly after visiting the U.S. for discus­
sions on the peace process, King Hussein publicly rejected 
American efforts to mediate in negotiations with Israel, in 
spite of American plans to sell advanced antiaircraft mis­
siles to Jordan— a clear sign of the difficulty in reaching
194a settlement with Israel without Syrian participation.
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Likewise, as a reflection of Syria's new ascendancy, the 
Saudis took the initiative in sttempting to mediate a 
settlement between Syria, its allies, and the Gemayal gov­
ernment, with its sponsorship of an eight-point plan to this 
end. In spite of the recent Saudi-Iraqi and Syrian-Iranian 
alignment, Riyadh sought to warm relations with Damascus with 
its plan, which called for repeal of the May 17 Lebanese- 
Israeli accord, a cease-fire among factions, withdrawal of 
foreign forces from Lebanon, and renewed unity talks, among 
other things. The plan was accepted by Amin Gemayel m  a
desperate attempt to save his government. Nonetheless, Syria 
rejected the plan, forcing Gemayel's government to abnegate 
the treaty with Israel unilaterally in order to bring about 
a cease-fire and return to negotiations. These talks resumed 
in March 1984 but broke up shortly thereafter without accom­
plishing a great deal. The final communique, in fact, only 
called for "consolidation of the nonexistent cease-fire in
Beirut and the formation of a committee to draft a new
196Lebanese constitution." Thus far neither has been accom-
197plished, even under pressure from Damascus.
Events in Lebanon have drastically changed Syria's 
position regionally and internationally. In Lebanon, Syria 
has been put in a new, more dominant position in Lebanon. 
Antigovernment forces are more strongly allied with Damascus, 
although this unity exists essentially for pragmatic reasons. 
Likewise, Syria is more closely allied with the Soviet Union,
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relying on them for arms and, presently, advisors to man the 
new, sophisticated Syrian air defense system. Thus far, 
however, Assad has displayed a high degree of independence 
from the will of Moscow. In fact, the relationship has 
tended to be the opposite, as the Soviets are anxious to 
keep their new foothold in the Middle East and increase 
their influence. On the other hand, Assad has humiliated
the U.S. and helped to lower its credibility in the region 
as a tenacious ally, making it more difficult for Arab states 
to oppose Syrian policies. Lastly, Israel's position in 
Lebanon has been weakened by opposition to its presence from 
the non-Christian Lebanese population and the Israeli people. 
At this point Syrian prospects seem much better than pre­
viously fcr achieving lasting preeminence in the politics of 
the region.
In Lebanon Assad managed to build his long-sought
base of support by organizing his allies against the Phalan-
gist government of Amin Gemayel. Under Syrian tutelage this
coalition ultimately brought down the Lebanese government
and forced an annulment by Gemayel of the May 17 agreement
in an effort to salvage his position of power. In the
process the United States withdrew from a direct position in
the conflict, and Israeli forces regrouped in South Lebanon,
outside the center of fighting, limiting their involvement to
air raids against Syrian-backed positions in retaliation for
199attacks on their own troops or in Israel. Thus, Syria was
62
left the dominant political and military force at the center 
of the conflict. It has, however, proven easier to foment 
chaos in Lebanon than to bring order, as Israel earlier 
found out in the aftermath of its 1982 invasion. Assad's 
failure to pressure Lebanese leaders into an agreement at 
the Lausanne talks in March (1984) raises the prospect that 
Syria too may fail to bring about a solution to its liking.
Conclusion
By April 1984 Hafez Assad's position in Lebanon and 
in the Middle East overall looked promising but by no means 
assured. Damascus has found a broad base of support in 
Lebanon and has used it to destroy the Gemayel government 
and force the abrogation of its agreement with Israel. More­
over, in the process the U.S. has withdrawn from active 
involvement in the conflict, its credibility in the region 
damaged along with its chances of settling the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. As for Israel, the other major foreign force 
involved, it has regrouped its forces in South Lebanon out 
of the mainstream of fighting, under pressure at home to 
withdraw from the quagmire. Also, Assad has finally managed 
to gain complete control of the PLO machinery, making it 
still more difficult to circumvent Damascus in any peace 
negotiations with Israel. Superficially at least, Assad's 
regime seems to be in a good position in Lebanon and the 
region, yet it must achieve complete success or face complete 
failure.
There are numerous potential obstacles which could 
stand in the way of Assad's success. Thus far Syrian actions 
have been geared toward unravelling the fabric of the Leba­
nese political system. Damascus has thereby become a natural 
rallying point for those elements in Lebanon dissatisfied
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with the system. A settlement of the Lebanese problem, how­
ever, requires positive actions on Assad*s part. Under such 
pressure his pragmatic alliance in Lebanon could easily fall 
apart and chaos reemerge outside Syrian control, which would 
be dangerous for Syria and the Ba*th regime. In fact, the 
alliance has already shown signs of ephemerality: witness
the failure to bring about a cease-fire, the breakdown of 
talks in Lausanne, and the resumption of fighting in spite of 
Syrian pressure. As yet the factional leaders are unable to 
consider serious changes to the political system, and Chris­
tian leaders continue to refuse to surrender significant 
political power to the Muslims— in spite of Syrian prodding. 
To complicate this situation indications of disunity within 
the factions raises the possibility that any agreement ham­
mered out by the leaders at the negotiating table might not
be adhered to at lower levels of command, with the result
201that strife could continue. For example, Christian Pha-
langist militia commander Fadi Frem has already warned he
would challenge Gemayel if he agrees to Syrian hegemony over 
202Lebanon. Clearly, then, obstacles to Assad's success
abound in Lebanon.
Beyond the dangers at the center of the Lebanese 
arena, there are others. South Lebanon remains in Israeli 
hands; and since the abrogation of the May 17 accord, Israeli 
leaders give every indication of securing that region against 
Syrian and Palestinean forces by their own continued presence
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and by strengtheninq the indigenous Christian militias-20  ^
Perhaps, with sufficient guarantees Israel would withdraw 
from Lebanon altogether, but so far no such guarantees have 
been forthcoming, leaving the potential that Syrian and 
Israeli forces might eventually face each other in a full­
blown conflict.
In the region as a whole the results of Syrian actions 
in Lebanon are unclear but potentially pernicious to Assad. 
Syria's new influence is being felt in the region, making any 
settlement of the conflict with Israel difficult without 
bamascus- -especia i .1y in view of the latter's control over the 
PLu. However, the extent of this influence is still unclear. 
There is the possibility that a coalition of onposi.ng states, 
such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, might form to offset 
Syrian influence. In such a situation Yasir Arafat, whose 
following among Palestineans remains unclear in strength, 
might join the coalition, diluting the importance of Syrian 
control, over the PLO in Lebanon and its control over the 
Palest i noun issue. Moreover, while Iran and Iraq are pres­
ently at war, Iraq could eventually join the anti-Syrian 
coalition upon the war':; conclusior Thus, just as Syria 
builds its influence, o* her Arab states could combine to 
offset it. This may, i fact have been behind recent con­
tacts between King Hussein v * dan, President Mubarak of
? 04Egypt, and Yasir Arafat (Pc / 1984).' In any case the
potential exists for a fore the Arab world to counter­
balance Syria's influence.
With regard to the superpowers us well, the results 
of Syrian involvement in Lebanon are ambivalent for Syria. 
After the destruction of its air defenses at the hands of 
Israel, the Soviets rearmed Syria with a much more advanced 
system, increasing the credibility of its deterrent against 
future attacks. Yet as a result Ansad is more firmly than 
ever in the Soviet camp, even dependent on Soviet technicians 
to man the sophisticated weapons system for several years.
To date, Assad has shown a high degree of independence from 
the will of Moscow, but Syria shows no signs of reversing 
the trend toward closer relations. Moreover, after humili­
ating the U.S. in Lebanon, relations with Vfashington have 
been at a low point, obviating Syria's policy of the 1970s 
which sought a more centrist stance between East and West.
The net effect of Syria's new position vis-cl-vis the super­
powers remains to be seen.
On the last front, the home front, the effect of 
Assad's policies in Lebanon could be potentially disrupting 
to the nosition of the ruling regime. At present Syria is 
relatively calm, at least on the surface, since Assad's 
brutal attempts to impose a Carthaginian peace in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Yet this has been at the expense of further 
deteriorating the regime's popularity. Surthermore, succes­
sion to the presidency has been called into question at a 
time when Assad's health is faltering, and there are signs 
of an internecine dispute going on between Rifaat Assad and
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the army hieiarchy- Against this background Syria*s 
position in L e b a n o n  may be potentially hazardous to Assad. 
The costly troop commitment continues to strain the ailing 
Syrian economy. Assad's actions against fellow Muslims in 
the PLO may raise resentment among the Syrian populace. And 
ultimately failure to impose a solution in Lebanon may be 
perceived as a failure of the regime, further destabilizing 
its position.
Lebanon for Assad’s regime is a double edged sword. 
If it establishes itself as undisputed master in a Lebanon 
shaped to its liking, Damascus will find its new influence 
in the region to be lasting, possibly putting it in a posi­
tion to derail or control the direction of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, and leaving it to deal with its domestic 
problems. If, on the other hand, the regime in Damascus 
fails to find a solution in Lebanon, uncontrolled chaos 
could emerge with several consequences: Israel might remain
in the South indefinitely? Assad's influence in the Arab 
world might deteriorate dramatically, with its corresponding 
implications for Syrian policies, and ultimately Assad's 
failure could prove fatal to the Ba'th regime.
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